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I. INTRODUCTION
WATH THE United States Supreme Court's recent denial of
the petition for writ of certiorari in the matter of Pittman v.
Icelandair, Inc.,' the question of whether the conduct of an air-
line or an airline's employee can ever render an airline liable
for interference with a child custody order appears to have been
resolved in favor of the airline industry. But should this be the
case? With estimates of intra-family child abductions in the
United States alone reaching upwards of 350,000,2 should com-
mon carriers who facilitate the wrongful removal of children
against court orders, specifically in the situation of international
abductions, be able to escape liability? This Comment will ad-
dress the issue of what an airline's liability and/or duty should
be to ensure that passengers, specifically children, are not travel-
ing in violation of court orders. To date, there has been little
analysis of this issue, and, as a result, I will frame my discussion
within the unique context of Pittman v. Grayson3 . I will begin
with a thorough analysis of the facts involved in the case, fol-
lowed by a detailed examination of the procedural history, fo-
cusing on the claims and defenses raised at each stage of the
litigation. To culminate my discussion, I will draw on existing
legal principles and case law in an effort to demonstrate why-
on both public policy and legal grounds-the original jury ver-
1 120 S. Ct. 59 (1999). Pittman involves a mother's wrongful removal of a child
from the United States, in violation of a joint-custody order, using a ticket bear-
ing a false name, and allegedly with the assistance of an Icelandair employee. A
more in-depth discussion of the facts and legal issues raised in Pittman will be
presented later in the Comment.
2 See Patricia E. Apy, Managing Child Custody Cases Involving Non-Hague Con-
tracting States, 14J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 77 (1997). This estimate is for the
year 1988, but, as a result of scarce empirical data, it is difficult to assess what the
exact current figures might be. This is especially true for statistics on interna-
tional abductions, although it has been estimated that these figures would be
even greater than those of intra-family abductions in the United States.
- 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
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dict should have been allowed to stand, and why the district5
and appellate6 courts erred in allowing Icelandair to escape lia-
bility for its role in the wrongful abduction of Elizabeth Pittman.
II. THE FACTS OF PITITMAN 7
In 1991, Frederick Pittman (plaintiff) sought sole custody of
his daughter, Elizabeth Pittman. At the time he shared custody
of his daughter with his ex-wife Erna Eyjolfsdottir (defendant), a
citizen of Iceland who at the time was residing in Florida with
Elizabeth and Anna Nicole Grayson, her other daughter from a
subsequent marriage. Erna testified at her deposition during
the custodial proceedings that she did not intend to remove the
girls from Florida. The court, however, issued a temporary in-
junction prohibiting Erna from removing Elizabeth from the
territory encompassed by the First Judicial Circuit of Florida.8
Meanwhile, Brian Grayson, the father of Erna's other daughter
Anna, obtained a court order prohibiting Erna from removing
Anna from northwest Florida. Grayson also arranged to have
Erna and the two girls' passports removed as a precautionary
measure, fearing that Erna might flee to Iceland before the cus-
todial proceedings concerning Anna were resolved.
Despite the two court orders prohibiting the removal of the
girls, Erna made arrangements to take the girls to Iceland. In
March of 1992, Erna obtained provisional passports through the
Icelandic Consul in Florida, presumably by claiming the pass-
ports had been lost. Sometime in the first part of April, Erna's
boyfriend at the time, Helgi Hilmarsson (also named as a defen-
dant in the original lawsuit), made arrangements with Ice-
landair for a May 2, 1992 flight from Florida to John F. Kennedy
Airport in New York and then from New York to Keflavik Airport
in Iceland. On April 10, three additional reservations for the
same flight were made for passengers Ms. S. Hilmarsson, Child
4 The jury originally rendered a $15 million verdict in favor of the plaintiff
(the father of the child who was removed from the U.S. against a court order)
against Icelandair. See id. The district courtjudge subsequently set aside the ver-
dict and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. See id.
5 See Pittman v. Grayson, No. 93 CIV. 3974JSM, 1997 WL 370331 (S.D.N.Y.July
2, 1997).
6 See Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 These facts are taken from the proceedings at both the district and appellate
court level. See Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Pittman v.
Grayson, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 (S.D.N.Y.July 2, 1997); Pittman
v. Grayson, 869 F. StIpp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
8 On May 4, 1992, Pittman was awarded sole custody of Elizabeth.
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"A" Hilmarsson, and Child "B" Hilmarsson. These reservations
were paid for by a credit card registered to Erna's stepfather,
Gudmundur Karl Jonsson (also named as a defendant).
During the weekend of April 17-19, Grayson realized Erna
and the two girls had disappeared. Suspecting that Erna might
attempt to take the two girls to Iceland, Grayson notified Pitt-
man and tried to prevent Erna from leaving the country. Gray-
son called the Baltimore-Washington and Orlando offices of
Icelandair on April 20, informing Icelandair representatives9
that Erna might attempt to leave the country with the girls
against court orders. Grayson asked if there were any reserva-
tions under the names of Erna Eyjolfsdottir or Pittman or Gray-
son, Etta or Ron Matlack, Elizabeth Jeanne Pittman, or Anna
Nicole Grayson. He was told that there were not any reserva-
tions under those names. Grayson also gave physical descrip-
tions of Erna and the girls, informing the representatives that
Erna would probably be traveling under an assumed name.
Four days after Grayson's phone calls to Icelandair represent-
atives, the original reservations were changed. The names on
the reservations were changed from Hilmarsson to the name
Karlsson, and the Florida to New York flights were cancelled,
with the departures rescheduled to take place from JFK Airport
on May 1. " Erna arrived with the two girls on May 1 at JFK
Airport and Icelandair representatives allowed her to board al-
though she held passports in their true names, tickets in the
name of Hilmarsson, and reservations under the name Karlsson.
The plaintiffs presented evidence that the original tickets, issued
under the name Hilmarsson, were nontransferable. However,
new tickets were never issued in the name Karlsson. Despite the
fact that Icelandair's customer service manual required employ-
ees to ensure that the name on the passport matched the name
on the ticket, Erna and the girls were allowed to board a flight
for which the names on their passports matched neither the
names on their reservations nor their tickets.
The plaintiffs presented further evidence to suggest that Olav
Ellerup, the senior passenger supervisor for Icelandair at JFK
Airport, altered the passenger manifest by making false entries
on the weight and balance code ' I so it appeared the party con-
9 Later at trial, Grayson was unable to identify the name or the title of the
representatives with whom he spoke to on that day.
10 This date was moved up from the originally scheduled May 2nd departure.
11 A weight-and-balance check-in is required of all passengers and is used in
assessing the weighting and balancing of the aircraft.
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sisted of a male, female, and child, instead of a female traveling
with two children. Ellerup, who checked in Erna and the chil-
dren, 2 stated at trial that the quickest way for someone to deter-
mine and locate a woman traveling alone with two children
would in fact be to check the weight-and-balance column of the
passenger manifest. Related evidence presented by the plaintiffs
demonstrated that Jonsson, Erna's stepfather whose credit card
was used to purchase the tickets, was the chief of the duty-free
store at Keflavik Airport, and was well known to Icelandair
executives. 13
On February 3, 1993, the Supreme Court of Iceland awarded
Erna sole custody of Elizabeth, and on May 2, 1993, almost a
year after a Florida court had awarded Pittman sole custody of
his daughter, the Icelandic Committee of Child Protection is-
sued an order proclaiming that there were no grounds to inter-
fere with Erna and her daughters' relationship. On February
15, 1993, the same court that awarded Frederick Pittman sole
custody of his daughter issued a warrant for Erna's arrest. In
early 1993, a team from Corporate Training Unlimited (CTU)14
failed in its attempt to retrieve the girls due to intervention by
the Icelandic police. Elizabeth Pittman was ten years old when
she was taken by Erna to Iceland in 1992. Her father has not
seen her since that time.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. ORIGINAL LAWSUIT AND ICELANDAIR'S MOTION TO DISMISS
In 1993, Frederick Pittman filed a lawsuit in state court 15 in
New York on behalf of himself and as the legal representative of
his daughter Elizabeth. Pittman brought the action against
12 Ellerup's initials were on the passenger manifest next to the Karlsson reser-
vations, indicating that he had checked them in. See Pittman, 149 F.3d at 116. At
trial, however, he testified that his normal duties did not consist of checking in
passengers and that he must have forgotten to log off from the computer system,
thereby allowing someone else to check in passengers under his name. See id.
Noteably, Icelandair admitted that Ellerup "ha[d]checked-in thousands of pas-
sengers as a check-in supervisor." Id.
13 A witness at the trial who was on a 1993 Icelandair flight with Erna and
Elizabeth testified that the two were given noticeable preferential treatment,
which a flight attendant attributed to Icelandair employees' relationships with
Elizabeth's grandfather.
14 CTU is an organization developed to recover children involved in interna-
tional custody cases.
15 The case was later removed to federal court by Icelandair as a result of diver-
sity jurisdiction.
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Erna, Hilmarsson, Jonsson, and Icelandair on the theory that
they had conspired to remove Elizabeth from the United States
in violation of his custody rights. The individual defendants did
not answer or appear, so the plaintiffs proceeded with the action
against Icelandair. Plaintiffs' claims against the airline consisted
of (1) intentional interference with parental custody, (2) inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) false
imprisonment.
In response, Icelandair brought a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that either (1) there was lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion based on the Warsaw Convention,16  or (2) section
1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act17 (FAA) preempted
plaintiffs' state law claims of intentional interference with custo-
dial rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false
imprisonment, or alternatively, (3) on the basis of forum non
conveniens. The court rejected Icelandair's first argument18
that the forum limitations of Article 2819 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose from "interna-
tional transportation. 2' The court determined that Article 1721
of the Warsaw Convention was the only applicable liability provi-
sion, and that it first needed to be determined if this provision
of the Warsaw Convention applied to the plaintiffs' claims.2 2 Re-
lying on case law and the legislative history of the Warsaw Con-
vention, the court found that Icelandair's conduct did not
qualify as an "accident" as is intended under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. 23 Therefore, the plaintiffs' state law causes
16 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention].
17 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter FAA].
18 See Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1071.
',, Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention provides that actions are brought: (1)
"in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of
the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business," (2) "where he
has a place of business through which the contract has been made," or (3)
"before the court at the place of destination." Warsaw Convention, supra, note
16.
20 International transportation is defined by Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Con-
vention, supra, note 16.
21 Article 17 states that "[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking." Warsaw Convention, supra, note 16.
22 See Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1068-71.
23 See id. at 1071.
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of action remained viable because they did not fall under the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention.24
As for Icelandair's claim that section 1305 of the FAA pre-
empted the plaintiffs' state law claims,25 the court noted "that
actions in which plaintiffs invoke traditional elements of tort
law-suing for personal injuries sustained in airport terminals,
during flights, or at the hands of airline employees or fellow
passengers-overwhelmingly incline against federal preemp-
tion. ' 26 The court also cited to case law that supported the pro-
position that a state claim should be evaluated not only as it
relates to services, but also as to what its impact is on the eco-
nomic competitiveness of airlines.2v The court's view was that
"allowing plaintiffs' suit to go forward would not frustrate the
ADA's 28 economic deregulation of the airlines nor would it sig-
nificantly impact the Airline's competitive posture. ' 29 Further-
more, the court agreed with the plaintiffs in that "the ADA is not
intended to be a safe harbor for airlines from civil prosecution
for the civil analogues of criminal offenses. '""
Icelandair's final argument under their motion to dismiss was
that the action should be dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens, and that Iceland was an adequate alternative fo-
rum.3" The court found that Icelandair had failed to demon-
strate it's claim, noting that the Supreme Court of Iceland had
chosen to disregard the Florida court order awarding sole cus-
tody of Elizabeth to Pittman, as well as the order for Erna's ar-
24 See id.
25 Section 1305(a) (1) of the FAA prohibits states from enforcing any law "relat-
ing to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier." FAA, supra, note 17. Icelandair
relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350
(5th Cir. 1993), where the court defined services as including "ticketing [and]
boarding procedures," arguing that the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the reserva-
tion, ticketing, and boarding of Elizabeth. Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1072. The
court noted that in a parallel action brought against Icelandair by Grayson
(Anna's father), the District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that
Grayson's state law claims were preempted by the ADA [The Airline Deregulation
Act]. Grayson v. Icelandair, Order of Dismissal, March 4, 1994. However, the
court stated that "[n]evertheless, based upon our reading of Hodges itself and
the treatment of ADA preemption by our sister courts in this Circuit we respect-
fully disagree with the holding of Grayson." Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1073, n.il.
26 Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1072.
27 See id.
28 The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) amended the FAA in 1978. See Airline
Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
29 Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1074.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 1074-75.
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rest and the two orders prohibiting Erna from removing the
girls from northwest Florida.3 2 In doing so, the court stated that
"Icelandair's failure to address the most formidable barrier to
plaintiffs' opportunity to be heard in an Icelandic forum-that
the Supreme Court of Iceland has granted custody to [Erna]
Eyjolfsdottir-renders its motion for dismissal based on forum
non conveniens fatally deficient. 33
B. THE JURY VERDICT AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUBSEQUENT
SET-ASIDE OF THE VERDICT
In light of the district court's rulings on Icelandair's motion
to dismiss, the plaintiffs in Pittman appeared to have a strong
and valid case against the airline on their claims of intentional
interference with custodial rights, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and false imprisonment. In fact, a jury found for
the plaintiffs, awarding $15 million in compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 4 Icelandair moved to set aside the jury verdict,
asking, in the alternative, for a judgment as a matter of law or a
new trial. 5
While acknowledging that the jury was entitled to find that
Ellerup had processed Erna and the girls' tickets despite the dis-
crepancies in the names on the passports, reservations, and tick-
ets, and that the jury was also entitled to find that Ellerup
falsified the entries on the weight-and-balance codes of the pas-
senger manifest, the judge found "that the evidence was not suf-
ficient to justify imposing liability on Icelandair for its role in
transporting the plaintiffs daughter out of the country."3 6 The
judge also noted that even if the evidence had been sufficient to
show that Icelandair conspired with Erna, the jury charge "was
in error in articulating the theory on which the defendant could
be held liable to the plaintiffs."37
The judge began his analysis by addressing the motion for
new trial, finding that the first part of the charge was proper.3
32 See id. at 1075.
31 Id.
34 Thejury awarded $7.5 million in compensatory damages plus $2.5 million in
punitive damages to Frederick Pittman, as well as $2.5 million in compensatory
damages plus $2.5 million in punitive damages to Elizabeth.
35 Pittman v. Grayson, No. 93 CIV 3974JSM, 1997 WL 370331 (S.D.N.Y. July 2,
1997).





The first part of the charge stated that in order to find Ice-
landair liable, the jury "must find that Icelandair knew that Erna
Pittman had no right to take Elizabeth to Iceland and that by
some wrongful act of its own aided or assisted her in removing
the child from the United States."39 The judge noted that had
he submitted only this portion of the charge, it may have been
appropriate. However, the charge did not end there, and he
found that the following portion rendered the charge improper:
Ordinarily, an airline has no obligation to determine whether a
child traveling on one of its planes with a parent is under a court
order that prohibits that travel. However, if an airline has actual
notice that there is a court order prohibiting the parent from
transporting the child to the place that is the plane's destination,
it would be wrongful for the airline to transport the child.40
The judge stated that the second sentence of the above
quoted portion of the jury charge was incorrect, since "[e]ven if
one were to assume that Icelandair had been told that there was
an order preventing Erna Pittman from taking the children to
Iceland, that alone would not provide a basis for imposing liabil-
ity on Icelandair."' 1 The judge found that if an airline had a
duty to refuse transportation to individuals that it had reason to
believe were traveling in violation of a court order, this would
also give airlines the right to deny someone the right to travel
on the basis of a suspicion that a court order existed restricting
that individual's travel.42 The judge's opinion goes on to state
that an "[a]irline does not, however, have an unfettered right to
decide who should or should not travel."43 The judge deter-
mined that an airline differs from other third-parties that could
be held liable for assisting one parent in depriving another par-
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Pittmam, 1997. No. 93 Civ. 3974 JSM, WL 370331 at *2.
42 See id.
43 Id. To support this proposition, the court cited Semon v. Royal Indem. Co.,
179 F. Supp. 403, 405 (W.D. La. 1959), affd 279 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1960) (quot-
ing as a general rule that "a common carrier of passengers is bound to receive for
carriage, without discrimination all proper persons who desire and properly offer
to become passengers .... ). What the court did not note is the previous state-
ment by the Semon court, that "[t]he distinction between a public or common
carrier of passengers and a special or private carrier of the same is that it is the
duty of the former to receive all who apply for passage, so long as there is room
and no legal excuse for refusing ...." Semon, 179 F. Supp. at 405 (emphasis added).
It should also be acknowledged that the court was concerned with common carri-
ers discriminating on the basis of race and color. See id. at 406.
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ent of their custodial rights. The difference involves the fact
that other third-parties do not have an obligation to assist the
parent, whereas in this instance Icelandair "had a duty to trans-
port anyone who sought to use its services and was not free to
refuse to transport ... simply because Mr. Grayson stated that
there was a court order prohibiting [Erna] from removing [the
girls] from Florida."44 The judge acknowledged that an airline
has the right to "refuse to transport someone who may pose a
risk to himself or other passengers," but that "the statutory ex-
ception is narrowly drawn. 45
The court also alluded to the notion that an airline's refusal
to transport a paying passenger could run afoul of the Fifth
Amendment by restricting an individual's freedom to travel.4"
While the Fifth Amendment is not applicable to Icelandair be-
cause it's a private actor, the judge cautioned that "the impor-
tance of the right to travel in our society strongly suggests that
the Court should be wary of imposing any obligation on a com-
mon carrier that might interfere with that aspect of an individ-
ual's liberty."47 Based on the foregoing analysis, the judge
reasoned that Icelandair was "at a minimum" entitled to its mo-
tion for a new trial.48
The court next addressed Icelandair's motion forjudgment as
a matter of law. 49 Acknowledging that the record established
more than just the fact that Icelandair transported Erna and the
girls to Iceland, the judge examined Olav Ellerup's role, focus-
ing on the question of "whether Ellerup's actions are sufficient
to establish that Icelandair joined in a conspiracy with Erna Pitt-
man to deny her ex-husband his lawful right to the custody of
his child."5" Referring to section 700 of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS (1977), the court recognized the tort of interfer-
ence with parental rights.51 In conjunction with section 876 of
44 Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *2.
45 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 41310 (West 1997)).
46 See Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *3.
47 Id.
48 Id.
411 See id. at *3-6.
50 Id. at *3.
5 1 Section 700 states that "[o] ne who, with knowledge that the parent does not
consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent
legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left
him, is subject to liability to the parent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 700
(1977).
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the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977),52 the court ac-
knowledged that an individual who assists a parent in the re-
moval of a child from a country in order to interfere with
another parent's custodial rights can be held liable to the parent
with whose rights they have interfered.53
To find that Ellerup's actions were sufficient for a determina-
tion that Icelandair conspired with Erna, or aided and abetted
Erna in depriving Pittman of his parental custody rights to Eliza-
beth, the court stated that two things must be established:5 4 (1)
Ellerup was aware of the wrongful nature of Erna's conduct, and
(2) Ellerup performed some act to further the unlawful pur-
pose. 55 Referring to the standard jury charge for membership
in conspiracy, 56 the court found the evidence presented was in-
sufficient to establish that Ellerup was aware of Erna's "unlawful
purpose to deprive her ex-husband of his lawful custody
rights. '5 ' The court also found that by proving that Ellerup al-
lowed Erna and the girls to leave despite the difference in the
names on the passport, reservations, and tickets, and that El-
lerup falsified the weight-and-balance codes, plaintiffs only es-
tablished that Ellerup assisted Erna in secretively leaving the
country. This alone was insufficient to establish liability.58 To
52 Section 876 states that:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in
concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him,
or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so
to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tor-
tious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes
a breach of duty to the third person.
53 See Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *4.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 The charge cited to by the court was as follows:
[T]he fact that the acts of a defendant, without knowledge, merely
happen to further the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy,
does not make the defendant a member. More is required under
the law. What is necessary is that the defendant must have partici-
pated with knowledge of a[t] least some of the purposes or objects
of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in the accom-
plishment of those unlawful ends.
Id. (citing to LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERALJJURY INSTRUCTIONS 19-41
(Matthew Bender 1996) (Conspiracy Instruction 19-6); see id. at 11-3 (Aiding and
Abetting Instruction 11-2)).
57 Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *4.
58 See id.
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establish liability, the court found that it was necessary to prove
that Ellerup knew Erna was attempting "to avoid detection be-
cause she was violating the custody rights of her ex-husband by
taking his child out of the country. ' 59 The court noted that
there was no evidence suggesting Ellerup was aware of the tele-
phone calls between Grayson and Icelandair at the Baltimore
and Orlando offices." The court likened Erna's behavior to
that of a woman "fleeing from an abusive and dangerous ex-
husband" and noted that Ellerup could very well have thought
"he was being a Good Samaritan" as opposed to knowing he was
taking part in a conspiracy. 6' The court also found that while it
was possible for the jury to conclude from the evidence that El-
lerup lied at trial, there were "a number of possible reasons that
might cause him to lie, even though his conduct on May 1, 1992
was entirely blameless."" 2 Therefore, the court concluded that
"[i] t is too great a leap to go from the conclusion that he [El-
lerup] testified falsely to the conclusion that he was aware of the
existence of a valid court order that Erna was violating by taking
the children to Iceland," and summarily granted Icelandair's
judgment as a matter of law.6"
C. PIrrMAN's APPEAL TO THE SECOND CIRCUIT
In response to the judge's setting aside of the jury verdict,
Pittman appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.6 4 In response to the district judge's notion that Ellerup
may have assisted Erna as a result of being under the impression
that she was fleeing an abusive ex-husband, Pittman's brief con-
tended that "Icelandair never suggested, much less testified, that
this was the reason it engaged in its improper conduct. '65 Pitt-
man argued that "[t]he District Court thus impermissibly in-
vaded the exclusive province of the jury to select among
competing, reasonable inferences, by substituting its view of the
matter for that of the jury. 66
59 Id.
60 See id.
(', Id. at *5.
I d. The court hypothesized that Ellerup could have lied as a result of the
fact that his employer was a defendant in a lawsuit where substantial monetary
damages were being sought.
63 Id.
64 See Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
65 Plaintiffs Say Judge Erred in Vacating Verdict on Child Custody Conspiracy, 1997




Pittman also claimed that his rights were prejudiced by the
district court's exclusion of a flight attendant's testimony that
Icelandair had smuggled Erna and the children out of the coun-
try.67 Pittman also contended the court should have given the
jury a negligence charge, "because Icelandair's conduct was an
extreme departure from its own rules and airline industry
norms."68 Pittman dismissed the argument presented by Ice-
landair that it would unduly burden the airline industry to im-
pose liability on an airline for transporting a passenger in
violation of a court order. Pittman's response was that "[t] here
is nothing burdensome about imposing liability on an airline
that boards passengers under phony names ... knowingly enters
false passenger information on its own internal flight docu-
ments . . . (and) doctors its own weight and balance codes to
disguise its passengers' identities."69
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's set aside of the jury verdict. 0 The court sum-
marily rejected the plaintiff's contention that Icelandair's Rule
50(a) v" motion for judgment as a matter of law was inadequate
as a result of a lack of specificity. 2 The court, noting that it did
not need to decide the issue, briefly discussed Icelandair's claim
that New York courts would not recognize a cause of action
against Erna. 3 In doing so, the court found that the state of the
law in New York regarding claims based on interference with
parental custody was decidedly unclear and also noted that
there was little authority to support the idea that Elizabeth could
maintain a claim of interference with custodial rights."
Turning to the issue of whether Icelandair had sufficient no-
tice, the court stated that to impose liability for "acting in con-
cert with the primary tortfeasor," either under the Restatement's





71 See FED. R. Clv. P. 50 (a).
72 See Pittman, 149 F.3d. at 119.
73 See id. at 120-22.
74 See id.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 876, supra, note 52.
76 The elements of concerted-action liability under New York law are "(1) an
express or tacit agreement 'to participate in a common plan or design to commit
a tortious act,' (2) tortious conduct by each defendant, and (3) the commission
by one of the defendants, in pursuance of the.agreement, of an act that consti-
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know the wrongful nature of the primary actor's conduct."7 7
The court agreed with the district court on this matter, stating
that "knowledge that conduct is clandestine does not necessarily
include knowledge of its motivation or legality."7 The court
found that the question "was whether the airline had been given
adequate notice to cause it to know that Erna was committing a
tort because her travel to Iceland with Elizabeth was prohibited
by court order."7 The court noted that the only evidence re-
garding Icelandair's knowledge was the phone calls by Grayson
to the Baltimore and Orlando offices, and went on to state:
More significant, however, is what Grayson did not do. He did
not, for example, contact the airline's New York offices, where
Icelandair's senior United States employees were located, or ask
to speak with a high-ranking office. He did not make any request
of, or give any information to, Icelandair in writing. And he did
not provide Icelandair with certified copies (or indeed any cop-
ies) of the court orders restricting Erna's travel with her
daughters.8 °
The court also noted that Icelandair had a general duty to
receive and transport paying passengers since they were a com-
mon carrier. The court therefore rejected the idea that the oral
representations were sufficient to relieve the airline of that
duty.81 In summary, the court decided:
[R]egardless of whether the other elements of concerted-action
liability are proven, and whatever authenticated type of notice
the New York courts might ultimately require in order to impose
such liability on a common carrier, we cannot infer that the state
courts would find that the knowledge element of such a claim
was established by Grayson's telephone calls.82
tutes a tort." Pittman, 149 F.3d at 122 (citing Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 591 N.E.2d 222 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77 Pittman, 149 F.3d at 123.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. The court went on to say that the only evidence relating to Icelandair's
knowledge was:
that two outlying Icelandair offices had received calls from a man
whose identity was not documented (who, indeed, was not Pittman
and could have been anyone), who spoke to random employees,
and who represented orally that Erna's travel with the girls was re-
stricted by court orders as to whose existence and authenticity he
provided no proof. Id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 124.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that if the court
found that the evidence was insufficient, the court should re-
mand for a new trial because the district court erred in prevent-
ing the introduction of a statement by an Icelandair flight
attendant.83 The statement was given to a television news pro-
ducer, who later described the conversation with the flight at-
tendant in her deposition testimony.14 The plaintiffs argued
that the statement was a vicarious admission that should have
been deemed non-hearsay, and therefore not excluded by the
trial court.8 5 The court found that there was no error in the
exclusion of the testimony by the trial court.86 First, by using a
double hearsay analysis (since the flight attendant said that it
was a story she had heard from someone else), the court found
that it was properly excluded since it contained hearsay.8 7 Sec-
ondly, the court decided that even if it did not contain hearsay,
the statement still did not prove Icelandair had knowledge that
Erna's flight was in violation of a court order, and therefore
would not provide a basis for a new trial.8 The court found that
the reference to Erna and the girls being "snuck" out of the
country added very little, since it was already determined that
"evidence of surreptitious intent was insufficient since Ice-
landair had not received legally sufficient notice of the court
order. Admission of [the flight attendant's] statement could
not have cured that defect."89
The plaintiffs' final argument was that if the court deter-
mined the evidence to be insufficient to support the jury's ver-
dict, then the court still should remand for a new trial on the
basis of Elizabeth's claim of negligence and Frederick's claim of
gross negligence, both of which the district court refused to sub-
83 See Pittman, 149 F 3d at 124.
84 According to the television producer, she was on an Icelandair flight when
the flight attendant noticed her reading newspaper articles about the incident.
The flight attendant commented on the articles, stating that " 'You know we
helped sneak'-snuck or smuggled, I really don't recall precisely- 'them out the
back way or service entrance at Dulles Airport.' And I asked her 'Oh, were you
involved in that? Do you know about this yourself?' And she said 'No, no, this is
just a story that I have heard,' and then she left." The airline admitted that the
named flight attendant was on the flight of the television producer, as well as on
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mit to the jury.90 In response, the court noted that under New
York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty of care and breached that duty in order
to establish a negligence claim. 91 The court found that the air-
line did not owe a duty of care to Frederick since his relation-
ship to the airline was as a member of the general public and no
"special relationship" existed between Frederick and Ice-
landair.92 The court did acknowledge the fact that Icelandair
owed duties of care to Elizabeth since she was a passenger, but
concluded that:
[Wle have seen no authority for the proposition that a common
carrier has a duty-either generally or based on oral representa-
tions-to ensure that a minor traveling with a custodial parent is
not being transported in violation of a court order. As discussed
in [previous portion of the opinion] above, the telephone calls
by Grayson to Icelandair's Orlando and Baltimore-Washington
offices were insufficient. 93
With that final statement, the Second Circuit concluded that the
district court's dismissal of the case as a matter of law was
proper, finding that the arguments presented by the plaintiffs
on appeal offered no basis for reversal.94
On June 4, 1999, Frederick Pittman filed a petition for certio-
rari with the U.S. Supreme Court contending that the jury ver-
dict in his favor for Icelandair's "deliberate interference with the
parent-child relationship" should not have been overturned by
the district court and the Second Circuit.95 Pittman argued that
the airline was a knowing participant in the wrongful removal of
his daughter. 96 He also asserted that the lower courts erred in
their conclusion "that a carrier is required to transport a paying
passenger, even if the name on the ticket does not match the
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See Pittman, 149 F.3d at 125. By way of example, the court cited the case of
Johnson v. Jamaica, 467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984). In Johnson, a couple sued a hospi-
tal for negligent infliction of emotional distress after their daughter was abducted
from the hospital nursery. The New York Court of Appeals found that there was
no direct duty on the part of the hospital to the parents to prevent the child's
abduction.
93 Pittman, 149 F.3d at 125.
914 See id.
95 Plaintiff Seeks High Court Review on 'Parental Rights' Verdict, 17 No. 3 ANDREWS
AVIATION LITIG. REP., July 13, 1999; see also Pittman v. Icelandair Inc., 149 F.3d




passport or other identification, and even with other indications
that a surreptitious and possibly illegal departure is being at-
tempted. '97 Pittman further stated that:
This novel and remarkable doctrine of law-used in this case to
upset a substantial jury verdict in favor of a father and a daughter
who, in violation of explicit court orders, have been illegally cut
off from any contact with each other-is directly contrary to fed-
eral aviation law, which negates any such duty.98
Despite Pittman's further arguments that the ruling of the
courts "endangers international air travel" and assists "parental
abductions in violation of federal law and international treaties"
the U.S. Supreme Court denied Pittman's petition for certiorari
on October 4, 1999.99
IV. RELATED CASE LAW
As noted in the Introduction, there has been little analysis of
the issue of a common carrier's liability in situations where ab-
ducted children are wrongfully removed in violation of court or-
ders. I have focused on the Pittman case because it is so unique
and because it deals specifically with the liability of airlines,
which appear to be the most accessible, easiest, and quickest
mode of international transportation. Research has failed to
turn up anything close to the situation found in Pittman, al-
though international parental abductions have become a grow-
ing epidemic, with most of these children being transported
overseas by way of airplanes. 100
One other case also touches on the issue of liability of com-
mon carriers for interference with child custody as in Pittman,
only in a domestic setting. Hyatt v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
deals with the failure of TWA to comply with an "Unaccompa-
nied Minor Child Care Services Request."''" In Hyatt, Anthony
Anderson purchased two tickets for his children to fly from the
home of his ex-wife Tina Marie Hyatt in Florida to St. Louis
where he and his wife lived. He notified the airlines that he
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id; see also 120 S. Ct. 59 (1999).
100 See, e.g., Apy, supra note 2; Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Ab-
duction: A Global Dilemma with Limited Relief - Can Something More Be Done?, 8 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 95 (1995); Susan Kreston, International Parental Kidnapping, 32 APR
PROSECUTOR 20 March/April (1998).
10, 943 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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would pick up the children from the airport. 12 The flight was
arranged so that the children would be arriving in St. Louis on
December 18, 1992.
Tina Marie modified the flight arrangements, taking the chil-
dren out of school early, and without notification to Anthony,
paid TWA an additional $50.00 to change the children's flight
so that they would arrive in St. Louis on December 16. Tina
Marie filled out an "Unaccompanied Minor Child Care Service
Request" form authorizing the airline to release the children to
their grandfather, Frank Porzenski. Anthony became aware of
the change in the children's flight and met the children at the
airport accompanied by his wife and two St. Louis police of-
ficers. The police officers turned the children over to their fa-
ther Anthony, and not to their grandfather.
Tina Marie and her father Porzenski sued TWA, Anthony,
Anthony's wife Mary Anderson, the City of St. Louis, and the two
police officers for fraud, breach of contract, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and tortious in-
terference with contract."" TWA moved to dismiss the fraud 104
claim for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted TWA's
motion to dismiss the fraud claim and also granted a motion for
summary judgment in favor of TWA on Tina Marie's breach of
contract claim.11 5 The trial court granted Anthony and his wife
Mary's motions for summary judgment on the claims for tor-
tious interference with contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress."' The trial court also granted summary
judgment in favor of the City and the two police officers on the
claim of false imprisonment."'
Tina Marie and her father appealed the trial court's ruling.
First, they contended that the trial court erred in granting
TWA's motion to dismiss the fraud claim. In her petition to the
trial court, Tina Marie alleged that she purchased two tickets
10 According to the parent's dissolution decree, the children were to spend
the entire Christmas break with their father. Id. at 294.
103 Specifically, Tina Marie brought claims of fraud and breach of contract
against TWA and claims of tortious interference with contract against the two
police officers and Anthony Anderson and his wife. Tina Marie and Porzenski
sought damages from the City of St. Louis and the two police officers for false
imprisonment and sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress from Anthony and his wife. See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 292, 294-95.
104 This included related punitive damage claims. See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 295.
. See id.
106 This included a dismissal of related punitive damages claims. See id.
107 This included a dismissal of related punitive damages claims. See id.
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from TWA and that the airline agreed that children would only
be permitted to leave the gate with their grandfather Porzen-
ski.""s Further allegations in Tina Marie's petition included:
That at the time of entering into the aforementioned contract,
[TWA's] agents and employees made certain statements to
[mother] of a material nature, to wit:
a. That [TWA] would only release the minor children to the
person of persons identified on the contract entered into be-
tween the parties.
b. That [TWA] would require the individual to present a
photo I.D. to confirm their identity before releasing the minor
children. 109
The Missouri Court of Appeals, upon a review of the elements
of fraud,' found that the trial court did not err in dismissing
Tina Marie's claim of fraud against TWA."' They found that
Tina Marie's petition did not plead facts to establish that the
representation made by TWA was false at the time it was made
or that TWA intended at the time the airline made the represen-
tation to act inconsistently with its representation. Further, the
court found that the airline's statements were not "misrepresen-
tations of then existing fact" because the facts pleaded did not
"indicate the falsity of TWA's representations at the time they were
made."'  2 The court stated that "at best" the statements made by
TWA could be considered a promise, and there was no cause of
action for fraud created by the breach of a promise." 3
In a second point of error, Tina Marie contended that the
trial court erred by granting TWA's motion for summary judg-
ment on her claim against the airline for breach of contract.'
She argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact con-
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 The court listed the elements of fraud as "(1) a representation, (2) the
falsity of the representation, (3) the materiality of the representation, (4) the
speaker's knowledge of the falsity of the representation or ignorance of its truth,
(5) the speaker's intent that the representation should be acted upon by the
hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer's ignorance
of the falsity of the representation, (7) the hearer's reliance on the truth of the
representation, (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon, and (9) the hearer's conse-
quent and proximately caused injury." Id. (citing Empire Bank v. Walnut Prod.,
Inc., 752 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
111 See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 296.
112 Id. at 295.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 296.
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cerning whether a contract existed between her and the airline
under which the airline had agreed to turn over custody of the
children to their grandfather Porzenski at the gate upon their
arrival in St. Louis.'" Reviewing the elements of a contract,116
the court noted Tina Marie's contention that legal considera-
tion, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation were
the only elements at issue related to validity of the contract.
Upon reviewing Tina Marie's second point of contention, the
court found that there had been no dispute before the trial
court as to who purchased the original tickets for the children's
travel from St. Louis to Florida since Tina Marie admitted that
she had not purchased these tickets. As a result, the contract
was between Anthony and TWA since he provided consideration
for the ticket and informed the airline that he was the only per-
son to whom the airline should release the children upon their
arrival in St. Louis. Tina Marie, therefore, was not a party to this
contract. " I7
Tina Marie's argument on appeal was that a separate agree-
ment existed with TWA concerning the release of custody of the
children because of the $50.00 she paid the airline to change
the children's flight arrangements. The court noted that Tina
Marie did not originally plead evidence of a separate contract,
but in fact at first alleged that she was the original purchaser of
the tickets from TWA. Looking to Tina Marie's deposition testi-
mony, the court also found that she indicated that she under-
stood the purchase to be only for a change in the departure date
of the children's flight. As a result, no issues of material fact
existed as to whether there was a separate contract between Tina
Marie and the airline, so the trial court properly granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of TWA.""
In light of this, the court summarily dismissed Tina Marie's
third point of contention-that the trial court erred in granting
Mary Anderson's motion for summary judgment on Tina
Marie's claim of tortious interference with her contract with
TWA. An essential element of tortious interference with a con-
tract is the existence of a contract, the breach of which is caused
115 See id.
116 The court listed the elements as "(1) competency of the parties to contract;
(2) subject matter; (3) legal consideration; (4) mutuality of agreement; and (5)
mutuality of obligation." Id. (citing Shapiro v. Butterfield, 921 S.W.2d 649, 652
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
17 See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 296.
1 See id. at 296-7.
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by the defendant's interference. This element could not be es-
tablished since the court had already found that no contract ex-
isted between Tina Marie and TWA.119
Tina Marie and Porzenski next asserted that the trial court
erred by granting Mary Anderson summary judgment on the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 120 The
court noted that Missouri recognizes the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress12 ' and that the plaintiffs asserted
on appeal that the standard for negligent infliction of emotional
distress 122 in Missouri had been incorrectly expanded to encom-
pass cases addressing intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 2 3  The court decided not to address the plaintiffs'
argument on this point, focusing instead on whether Tina Marie
and Porzenski established a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, specifically, whether "extreme and outra-
geous" conduct on the part of Mary Anderson was
demonstrated. 124
The allegations made by both plaintiffs against Mary Ander-
son were as follows:
That on or about December 16, 1992, Defendant, Mary Ander-
son, did intentionally seize and take custody of the minor chil-
dren from Lambert Field when [she] had no entitlement to do
SO.
119 See id. at 297. While this claim was also brought against the father, Anthony
Anderson, the plaintiffs did not pursue it or any of their other claims against him
on appeal since he was discharged in bankruptcy.
120 See id.
12, The court listed the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as: "(1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defen-
dant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous; and (3) the conduct must be
the cause (4) of severe emotional distress." Id. (citing Boes v. Deschu, 768
S.W.2d 205, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
122 This standard was established by Bass v. Nooney Co., and requires that emo-
tional distress "must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant" to
establish a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Hyatt,
943 S.W.2d at 297 (quoting Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983)).
It seems that this standard was often construed by the courts to dismiss claims
where medical treatment was not sought by the plaintiff on the basis that they did
not satisfy the "medically significant" standard. See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 297.
123 See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 297.
124 See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 297-8. The court defined the test for "extreme and
outrageous" conduct as conduct that is "so outrageous in character, and so ex-
treme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. at 298
(quoting Rooney v. National Super Markets Inc., 668 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984)).
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That after obtaining custody of the minor children from the
airport ... , Mary Anderson, then took the minor children to
whereabouts unknown to Plaintiff and further prevented Plaintiff
or anyone in Plaintiffs family from contacting the minor chil-
dren for three weeks.' 2
5
The court looked to these allegations and found that the
plaintiffs' pleadings lacked the essential "extreme and outra-
geous" element. 26 Even if the plaintiffs had pleaded the ele-
ment, the court concluded that the conduct described within
the facts of the pleading would not qualify as "extreme and out-
rageous."' 27 Therefore, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did
not establish the elements for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and as a result the trial court's granting of Mary Ander-
son's motion for summary judgment was proper. 28
Tina Marie's and Porzenski's final contention on appeal was
that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment presented by the police officers and the city of St.
Louis.'29 The relevant claims were Tina Marie's allegations
against the police officers for tortious interference with her con-
tract with TWA, claims made by Tina Marie on behalf of the
children for false imprisonment against the police officers and
the city, and Porenzki's charge against the police officers and
the city for false imprisonment. 3" In accordance with the
court's prior ruling that no contract existed between Tina Marie
and TWA, the court found the granting of summary judgment
in favor of the city and police officers on the tortious interfer-
ence with a contract claim proper.'31
Turning to the false imprisonment claim 11 2 raised by Porzen-
ski against the police officers and the City of St. Louis, the court
found that while the police officers had Porzenski remain in the
airport waiting area and prevented him from speaking with or
approaching the children until they were in their father's cus-
2 5 Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 298.
126 See id.
127 See id.
I 2 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See Hyatt, 943 S.W.2d at 298.
-12 The court defined false imprisonment as occurring "when the plaintiff is
confined by the wrongdoer without legal justification" and the elements consist-
ing of "the detention or restraint of the plaintiff against his or her will and the
unlawfulness of the detention or restraint." Id. at 299 (citing Desai v. SSM Health
Care, 865 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
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tody, they did not employ any physical force or threaten Porzen-
ski. 1 33 In order to qualify as false imprisonment, the court
reasoned that Porzenski must establish that he was completely
restrained and not just prevented from going wherever he
wanted to go. 134 Since Porzenski was permitted to have contact
with the children after they were in their father's custody, and
because the police were there solely as peace keeping agents,
the court found that Porzenski's restraint was not complete and
therefore did not qualify as false imprisonment.'35
Evaluating Tina Marie's claim of false imprisonment on be-
half of the children, the court stated that in order for a cause of
action to be established, the children would have had to be re-
strained without legal justification.1 Since the children were
placed in the care of their father, in accordance with Tina
Marie's and Anthony's dissolution decree indicating Anthony
had custody at that time, the court found that the actions of the
police were legally justified.'37 Since Tina Marie could not re-
cover against the police officers, she was prevented from recov-
ering against the City of St. Louis since her cause of action was
based on respondeat superior. 38 Therefore, the court found
that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of the police and the city of St. Louis on Tina Marie's claims of
false imprisonment. 39 With this final ruling, the judgment of
the trial court was affirmed on all of the plaintiffs' points of
error. 140
Hyatt serves as a good example of the difficulty of maintaining
a cause of action involving interference with child custody
rights. While the fact situation differs from that presented in
Pittman, it illustrates the difficulty and complications involved in
ensuring and asserting child custody rights even in a domestic
forum. Despite the mother's completion of the "Unaccompa-
nied Minor Child Care Service Request" form, the father was
still able to assert custody of the children, and the airline al-
lowed them to be removed in spite of the mother's request.
While local police were present in this situation, one must ques-
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tion whether the father did actually have custody of the children
at that time. After all, they were removed from school early so
that they were able to fly to St. Louis early and visit with their
grandfather. The father's custodial rights did not occur until
Christmas Break. In any event, it is evident from the case that
child custody issues are complicated, and while they are difficult
to manage from state to state, the degree of difficulty and
chance of not recovering custody of the children only increases
when dealing with international situations. Hyatt drives home
the point that is certainly demonstrated by Pittman-guidelines
and remedies are needed for handling situations where airlines
are involved with the interference with child custody rights. The
following section will revisit Pittman and the legal issues raised at
each stage of the proceedings, with an examination of the impli-
cations of decisions such as Pittman and Hyatt in situations where
a child is wrongfully removed from a parent's custody and an
airline stands as a possible party to the abduction.
V. WHY THE COURTS IN PITFMAN WERE WRONG
A. THE DISTRICT COURT
1. The Role of the Factfinder
In its decision to overturn the jury's verdict in favor of Freder-
ick Pittman, the court acknowledged on numerous occasions
that various facts could give rise to the inference that Olav El-
lerup knew he was aware that he was violating a court order by
assisting Erna out of the country with the children.' 4 ' These
include:
(1) Olav Ellerup allowing Erna and the children to leave
when the names on the tickets, passports, and reservations all
differed;
(2) Ellerup's falsification of the weight and balance codes, so
that it appeared that a male, female, and a child were traveling
instead of a woman and two children;
(3) that Ellerup lied at trial, denying that he processed Erna
and the children at Kennedy National Airport; and
(4) the evidence that Erna's father was well known by and well
connected to Icelandair.
According to the court, there were two things that had to be
established in order to find Icelandair liable through the actions




of its employee in the aiding and abetting of Erna in depriving
Frederick Pittman's legal right to custody of his child. These
requirements included: "(1) that [Ellerup] was aware of the
wrongful nature of [Erna's] conduct and (2) that [Ellerup] per-
formed some act to further that unlawful purpose."' 4 2 Despite
the evidence presented, the court concluded that this was still
not enough to establish that Ellerup knew Erna was trying to
leave the country undetected so as to remove her children from
their father's legal custody.143 What is most disturbing about the
court's action is not that it disregarded findings and inferences
it conceded the jury could have made, but that the court pro-
ceeded to place itself in the role of the factfinder, displacing the
role of the jury. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the U.S. Supreme Court, "[f]indings of fact ... shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility."'44 "Rule 52 (a) applies to findings of fact, including
those described as 'ultimate facts' because they may determine
the outcome of the litigation." 45 The findings of fact that were
made by the jury in Pittman appear to be "ultimate facts" upon
which the outcome of the trial rested and which presumably
should be subjected to a clearly erroneous standard.
The court went so far as to come up with other possible infer-
ences, almost excuses, as to why Ellerup could have behaved in
the manner that he did. The court brought up the fact that
Ellerup may have thought that he was acting as a "Good Samari-
tan," rescuing Erna from an abusive situation and therefore ig-
noring the inconsistency in the names on the passports, tickets,
and reservations."' Yet in raising this inference the court fails
to point to any evidence presented (or even any arguments
made) that support this conclusion. The court ignores the sur-
rounding circumstances that support the conclusion that the
jury ultimately reached-that Ellerup was aware of his participa-
tion in a conspiracy to transport the children against court or-
ders. Why else do it so surreptitiously?
The court also speculated as to why Ellerup may have lied on
the stand when he denied that he was the one who processed
142 See id. at *4.
143 See id.
144 FED. R. Crv. P. 52 (a); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 498 (1984).
"45 Bose, 466 U.S. at 501.
146 See Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *5.
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Erna and the children, finding that "there are a number of rea-
sons that might cause [Ellerup] to lie, even though his con-
duct ... was entirely blameless." '147 Once again, the court does
not point to any evidence or arguments supporting its conclu-
sion that Ellerup may not have lied to cover up his involvement
in knowingly aiding Erna in her covert abduction of the chil-
dren. Instead of allowing the jury to determine Ellerup's credi-
bility, the court dismissed the inference made by the factfinder
and found that because there are possible alternate reasons be-
hind Ellerup's actions, a credibility determination cannot be
made one way or the other. As Frederick Pittman argued, the
court truly did "impermissibly [invade] the exclusive province of
the jury to select among competing, reasonable inferences, by
substituting its view of the matter for that of the jury."'48
2. The Jry Charge
The court observed that the jury charge would have been ap-
propriate if it had read that to find Icelandair liable, the jury
"must find that Icelandair had no right to take Elizabeth to Ice-
land and that by some wrongful acts of its own aided or assisted
her in removing the child from the United States."' 49 The court
ruled inappropriate the section of the jury charge instructing
that if Icelandair had notice of the court order, it would be
wrongful for the airline to transport the child,""° acknowledging
that notice alone was not a basis to find the airline liable.' 5'
However, the section of the jury charge deemed appropriate by
the court would appear to support the jury's finding. It is not
focused on whether Icelandair had actual notice (as a result of
Grayson's phone calls), but instead on whether Ellerup knew
that Erna had no right to take Elizabeth to Iceland, and whether
he committed a wrongful act (ignoring the discrepancies in the
names, altering the weight and balance codes, and secretively
boarding the girls through an alternate entrance). While a por-
tion of the jury charge may be inappropriate as a result of its
reference to actual knowledge of the airline,5 2 the appropriate
1,17 See id.
1"1 Plaintiffs Say Judge Erred in Vacating Verdict on Child Custody Conspiracy, 1997
ANDREwS AVIA] ION Lrri. REP. 25228, November 11, 1997.
"19 See Pitt man, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *2.
150 See supra Part I.B.
'51 See Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *2.
1-52 The "inappropriateness" of this is also questionable, and will be further dis-
cussed in the next section.
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section of the jury charge alone could still support a finding in
favor of the plaintiffs. Thus, rendering a new trial would seem
to be a more appropriate remedy than granting Icelandair's mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law.
3. The Knowledge and Duty to Transport Required of Icelandair
In its discussion of the jury charge, the court mentioned that
even if Icelandair had knowledge that a court order existed ex-
plicitly preventing Erna from taking the children to Iceland, this
would not be enough to provide a basis for imposing liability on
the airline. 5 3 The court then discussed how an airline is a com-
mon carrier and therefore must transport all those who seek its
services. The court distinguished airlines from third parties who
assist parents in the wrongful abduction of their children from
the parent who holds legal custody.'54 The court considered
other third parties to be acting out of gratuity, whereas Ice-
landair was bound to transport Erna and the children.155 The
court noted that an airline does, however, have the right to re-
fuse transportation to an individual who may pose a risk to him-
self or to fellow passengers. 156 The court went so far as to state
that it "should not lightly impose a duty on an airline to refuse
to transport a passenger who can pay for a ticket."'5 1
The court did not consider the fact that while an airline can-
not turn away passengers indiscriminately, it can turn them away
if they have a legal basis for doing so, especially if the passenger
is considered a security risk.' 8 While most statutory provisions
regarding security measures are focused on threats posed by hi-
jackers or terrorists,' 59 arguably Erna's ability to travel in spite of




157 See id. at *3.
158 See e.g., 8A Am. JUR. 2D Aviation §73 (1999) (addressing security measures
for screening passengers and removing passengers who are a perceived security
risk, stating in part that a removed passenger would not have a cause of action
"even if the passengers were not in fact a risk, as long as the airline had well
founded suspicions." While the airline is required to act reasonable when remov-
ing a passenger, "[r] easonableness is to be tested on the information available to
the airline at the moment a decision is required and does not include a duty to
conduct an in-depth investigation.") (emphasis added). See id.
159 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 44904 (West 2000) (outlining security requirements
for assessing threats and assessing security); Wendy Giebler, Reclaiming the Skies
From Terrorism: The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 757 (1992); Laurie M. Mcquade, Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: the American
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erroneous and inconsistent documentation posed a risk to the
security of the flight. A suspicion that a child is wrongfully be-
ing transported against a court order should be sufficient reason
alone to refuse transport, considering the fact that the child is a
passenger whose safety must be ensured. Inconsistent docu-
mentation should most assuredly qualify as a "reasonable" rea-
son for refusing transport to a passenger. While the court
proffers that Erna could have been fleeing an abusive home, it
does not consider the fact that allowing such a reason to serve as
an excuse for allowing a passenger, especially a passenger travel-
ing with minor children, can have dangerous ramifications.
Erna could have been a stranger who had kidnapped the chil-
dren and was trying to flee the country by way of the airline.
The potential threat of a child's safety or well-being, and the
possibility that a court order is being violated, should serve as a
reasonable legal basis for refusing transport to a passen-
ger-regardless of whether that individual has paid for his or her
ticket. The court overlooks the safety of the children as fellow
passengers, as well as the potential volatile situation that could
arise from allowing individuals to board airplanes in spite of the
possibility that they are fleeing the country against a court
order.
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT
1. The Issue of Notice
The first issue the court addressed in its opinion was the issue
of notification. But the court's opinion leaves unclear how
much notification is enough to impute knowledge to the airline.
As the Second Circuit noted:
The [district] court found that while there was sufficient evi-
dence to establish that Icelandair, through its agent Ellerup, had
knowingly assisted Erna in her attempt to leave the country sur-
reptitiously, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that El-
lerup was aware that Erna's conduct violated Frederick's custody
rights or a court order restricting her travel with Elizabeth.'"
The court seemingly states that in order for Icelandair to have
"knowledge," Ellerup or Icelandair needed to have actual knowl-
edge that they were violating a specific court order forbidding
Way?, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 325 (1996) (examining security regulations in the
United States and internationally, specifically in the aftermath of the Lockerbie
tragedy).
160 Pittman, 149 F.3d at 117.
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that specific act. While the opinion tells us that the phone calls
may have sufficed to establish knowledge on behalf of the airline
had Grayson made them to the New York office instead of the
Orlando and Baltimore offices, it does not tell us what would
have established knowledge on the part of Ellerup. It appears
that this determination would have been made by the jury upon
evaluation of Ellerup's actions and the surrounding facts, but as
previously noted, the credibility determinations and inferences
made by the jury were subsequently disregarded by the district
court.
Is it not enough that Ellerup disregarded company policy,
that he altered the weight and balance codes, that he lied on the
stand about his involvement, and that there was a strong rela-
tionship between Erna's father and the airline? Apparently not.
So what more would it take? A statement by Ellerup that he was
aware in fact of the court order? Perhaps a statement to the
same effect by one of the flight attendants who "fawned" over
Erna and the girls during their flight would suffice (this proba-
bly would not be sufficient since the flight attendant's state-
ments supporting Pittman's claims were excluded from
evidence at trial). Realistically speaking, the chances that such
evidence would ever be available in this type of case are slim.
There appears to be no standard established as to what would
constitute sufficient notice, making it almost impossible to
gauge whether a successful cause of action would ever be
possible.
This is not a situation where the unwary customer holds the
door open for a departing individual as he makes his way into
the bank, only to learn later that the individual had just robbed
the bank and was fleeing the scene of the crime. In that in-
stance we would not think of holding the customer liable under
a concerted action liability theory for facilitating the bank rob-
ber's escape. But that is not the situation presented here. One
can imagine that Icelandair and Ellerup were aware of why Erna
needed to flee the country so secretively-because she had lost
custody of her children and wanted to take them to Iceland
where she would find a favorable court system (as evidenced by
the Supreme Court of Iceland awarding her custody and all but
ignoring the court orders in the United States). Even if it was
believed that Erna was a battered wife trying to escape her hus-
band (an argument never made at trial and first introduced by
the district court judge in his set aside of the jury's verdict), this
would still render her actions illegal. Unless the airline or El-
20001
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lerup were aware that Erna in fact had full custody of the chil-
dren, then any travel to Iceland in which it was apparent that
she was trying to escape detection would fall under the premise
of illegal activity, and would establish concerted action liability
on the part of Icelandair. The requirement calls for knowledge
of wrongdoing-not knowledge of the specific nature of the
wrongdoing. It is reasonable to conclude that the airline and
possibly Ellerup knew they were participating in aiding Erna in
her wrongdoing (the inconsistent documentation and secretive
nature of the departure would indicate this), even if they were
not aware of the specific court order.
It is also interesting to note that Ellerup altered the weight
and balance codes to disguise Erna and the girls so that it ap-
peared that a women, man, and child were traveling. But who
would use this information to detect Erna's travel? Presumably
it would not be an abusive ex-husband (it is doubtful that he
would have access to this information), but in fact it would be
law enforcement officials. Why try to hide Erna's actions from
law enforcement officials if Ellerup and the airline were not
aware of the wrongful nature of Erna's conduct?
The court also spoke to what Grayson failed to do when he
attempted to notify the airline that he suspected his ex-wife was
trying to flee the country with the children against court or-
ders."' The court criticized Grayson for only calling the Balti-
more-Washington and Orlando offices, implying that a call to
the New York offices of the airline and a request to speak to
higher ranking officials would have provided more of a basis for
finding knowledge on the part of the airline. 62 But why the
New York offices? It seems logical that he would contact the
Orlando office since it was probable that Erna would have made
her flight arrangements through the Florida branch of the air-
line. As for the call made to the Baltimore-Washington office,
according to the airline's web site, Baltimore is the North Ameri-
can Headquarters for Icelandair. "" Consequently, the head-
quarters for the airline would appear to be the proper place to
call, not the New York office. Although while the court criti-
cized Grayson for not asking to speak to high ranking officials,
one has to wonder why those employees with whom he did
-1 See id. at 123.
162 See id.
163 See lcelandair Offices & Agents in North America, (visited Feb. 19, 2000)
<www.icelandair.com> (other offices in North America include Boston, Ft. Lau-
derdale, New York, and Halifax).
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speak did not forward his phone call on to a more senior officer
of the company, or at least instruct Grayson as to what was neces-
sary in order for the airline to take any action on Grayson's
claim. Yet there is no indication that these actions were taken
by the airline. And if these actions had been taken would that
qualify as notice on the part of the airline? Presumably, Grayson
did not jump through enough hoops, or even the right ones for
that matter, to ensure that proper notification was received by
the airline and that the children were not wrongfully taken by
Erna to Iceland.
2. The Dismissal of the Negligence Claims
As Frederick Pittman argued, a negligence charge should
have been given to the jury "because Icelandair's conduct was an
extreme departure from its own rules and airline industry
norms."' 4 While this claim was dismissed because the court felt
that the airline owed no duty of care to Frederick since he was
only a member of the general public," 5 the court recognized
that the airline did owe some duty of care to Elizabeth as a pas-
senger, but refused to recognize that such a duty included en-
suring that a minor was traveling with a custodial parent. 6 '
Arguably, the court misconstrued the issue. It is not whether
the airline had a duty to ensure that the children were traveling
with a custodial parent, and were not being transported against
a court order, but whether the airline had a duty not to facilitate
the illegal travel. Icelandair made a departure from its own
company policy both in the boarding of Erna and the children
even though the names on their non-transferable tickets did not
match the names on their reservations or their passports, and in
altering the weight and balance codes. In doing this, Icelandair
did more than simply fail to ensure that the children were not
traveling against a court order; they facilitated the illegal act.
According to Section 448 of the Restatement Second of Torts:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or
crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting there-
from, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation
which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit
such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent
164 See Plaintiffs Say Judge Erred in Vacating Verdict on Child Custody Conspiracy,
1997 ANDREWS AVIATION LriG. REP,. 25228, November 11, 1997.
165 See Pittman, 149 F.3d at 125.
166 See id.
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conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such
a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime."'
Allowing someone to travel with improper documentation
and altering documents that would allow a passenger to escape
detection creates a situation where a "third person," in this case
Erna, could avail herself of the situation to commit a tort or a
crime. According to the comments accompanying Section 448,
the rule "applies when the actor's conduct creates a situation
which is utilized by a third person to inflict intentional harm
upon another or provides a temptation to do so to which the
third person yields, but the actor has no reason to expect that
the third person would so act."' 8
The comments to Section 448 goes on further to find that:
[I]t is not necessary that the conduct should be negligent
solely because of its tendency to afford an opportunity for a third
person to commit the crime. It is enough that the actor should
have realized the likelihood that his conduct would create a
temptation that would likely lead to its commission.
This is true although the likelihood that such a crime would be
committed might not be of itself enough to make the actor's con-
duct negligent, and the negligent character of the act arises from
the fact that it involves other risks which of themselves are
enough to make it unreasonable, or from such risks together
with the possibility of crime. '
So while Icelandair may not owe an affirmative duty to either
Pittman or the children in the sense that it did not have a duty
to ensure that a court order was not violated by the girls' travel,
there seemingly exists a duty not to facilitate, through gross dis-
regard of established company policy, the criminal conduct of a
third person. This seems even more obvious in an analogous
case cited by the court where the court found that a hospital did
not owe any direct duty to parents whose infant was abducted
from the hospital nursery-an outcome that appears even more
absurd. 7" In Pittman, the facts lend themselves to an even
stronger claim than mere negligence when considering the de-
liberate and intentional nature of Ellerup's actions. Taking into
account Section 448, it is conceivable that Pittman may have a
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
]6s RESTATEMEN' (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 cmt. a (1965).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 cmt. c (1965).
17, SeeJohnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984).
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stronger argument than his daughter Elizabeth for a claim of
negligence against the airline, even though Elizabeth was a
passenger.
While an airline may not have the narrowly construed duty "to
ensure that a minor traveling with a custodial parent is not be-
ing transported in violation of a court order," at a minimum
there is a duty to ensure the safety of a passenger. 7 ' As a com-
mon carrier, an airline "owes both a duty of utmost care and the
vigilance of a very cautious person towards [its] passengers."'72
Violation of federal safety regulations often constitute some
form of negligence: either negligence per se, negligence as a
matter of law, a presumption of negligence, or at the very least,
evidence of negligence. 7 3 As a passenger, the airline had a duty
to ensure that Elizabeth was afforded the protection of safety
and security procedures, and not to create an opportunity that
would place Elizabeth in danger. In a situation such as Pittman,
where there is in fact a gross deviation from standing operating
procedures and policies, the safety of all passengers, not just
those directly affected, are put at risk.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PITTMAN
A reading of the series of decisions in Pittman, as well as the
Hyatt decision, leads to the conclusion that the courts were try-
ing to do one thing and one thing only-avoid imposing any duty
or responsibility on airlines in situations involving child custody
issues. In doing so the courts overlooked what effect this would
have on issues of safety and security in the aviation industry, as
well as what this would mean for parents who stand to lose their
children to international and possibly even domestic abduc-
tions. The next section will examine what decisions like Pittman
and Hyatt mean when applied in the context of the real world.
A. SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES
The district court referred to the fact that Erna was permitted
to travel despite the variances in the names on the tickets, reser-
vations, and passports, and also acknowledged that Ellerup falsi-
fied the weight and balance codes.' 74 But in doing so the court
171 Pittman, 149 F.3d at 125.
172 Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994). See also 8A
AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 118 (1997).
173 See 8A Am. JUR. 2D. Aviation § 114 (1997).
174 See Pittman, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL 370331, at *5.
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only addressed the possibility that Ellerup believed he was a
"good samaritan," overlooking the safety and security issues in-
volved in Erna's and Ellerup's actions. 75 It begs the question of
whether an agent responsible for processing passengers and en-
forcing airline policies can make a determination as to whether
that policy can be violated because the possibility exists that the
passenger has a good reason for the inconsistent paperwork and
identification.
FAA regulations address falsifications made by individuals re-
sponsible for airplane security, including that:
No person may make, or cause to be made any of the
following:
(b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or
report that is kept, made, or used to show compliance with this part,
or to exercise any privileges under this part.
(c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, of any
report, record, security program, access medium, or identification
medium issued under this part. 176
Presumably, Ellerup's actions fall under this provision of the
FAA regulations because he altered the weight and balance
codes that were kept in part as a security measure, and that
would have served as a useful tool for law enforcement agents to
locate Erna and the children. This is all but overlooked by the
courts in their discussion of both the notification element of
concerted action liability and the negligence claims. The courts
appeared to almost approve of Ellerup's actions when they re-
ferred to him as a possible "good samaritan." Had this been an
instance where a dangerous criminal or a suspected drug dealer
were allowed to leave the country under such conditions, one
can imagine that the courts would not have come so quickly to
the rescue of Ellerup. Presumably there would be some discus-
sion of the danger that was created from such a gross deviation
from safety and security regulations, and one in which law en-
forcement officials' efforts are possibly thwarted through the al-
teration of weight and balance codes.
As a common carrier, an airline is "under the duty to exercise
either a high or the highest degree of care for the safety of its pas-
sengers."' 177 But the scope of safety and security provisions is
175 See id.
176 14 C.F.R. § 108.4 (2000) (emphasis added).
177 8A A-M. JUR. 2D § 118 (1997) (emphasis added) (noting, however, that in
New York, common carriers owe a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety
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narrowly drawn, focusing mainly on preventing terrorist activity
aboard airlines, and preventing airline crashes. 171 Undoubtedly,
the checking of identification, and ensuring that names match
on passports, tickets, and reservations, is an important step in
preventing security risks from occurring, just as are measures
ensuring that passengers have not left their bags unaccompa-
nied, or requiring all passengers to pass through metal detec-
tors. So why did the court treat this departure from airline
policy so lightly? It is possible that when considering safety and
security, the focus is on hijackers and terrorists, and not abduc-
tions of children, especially those involving abductions by a non-
custodial parent. This may explain why in the court's discussion
of the scope of an airline's ability to refuse transport to a passen-
ger, although the exception is based on allowing airlines to re-
fuse transport only when there is a legal excuse, the focus
remains on refusing to transport only passengers who pose a
threat of committing a criminal act (most likely one involving
physical violence) on board the aircraft.'17 1
It is dangerous to limit these security measures to just those
passengers who pose a possible physical threat to other passen-
gers or the operation of the aircraft. By allowing those responsi-
ble for enforcing security measures to waive standards on the
belief that they are acting as a "good samaritan," the court opens
the door to airlines serving as a vehicle, and in a sense an escape
device, to those seeking to commit other types of crimes and
needing transportation from an airline as a means to accom-
plishing illegal ends. It gives the airlines the green light to bend
their security measures when deemed necessary, and yet not suf-
fer any consequences when their decisions prove incorrect. Ul-
timately, it also exposes other passengers to safety risks when
of their passengers) (citing O'Leary v. American Airlines, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (involving an intoxicated passenger who choked while eating)).
178 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 44901, 44904 (West 2000); see also 14 C.F.R.
§§ 107.13, 108.4, 108.11 (2000).
179 It has been noted that this trend is changing, and that airlines are using
§ 1111(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1511(a). See
Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Propriety of Refusal of Airline to Transport Passenger or
Property Under § I1Il(A) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 75 A.L.R. FED. 212 (1985)
(citing cases where airlines refused transport to passengers on the basis that a
passenger's physical condition posed a threat to his safety or the safety and conve-
nience of other passengers or the airline and citing a case where the airline re-
ceived notification from the FBI that a passenger was a fugitive from the law and
had been diagnosed as schizophrenic).
4372000]
438 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
security measures and procedures are not uniformly and strictly
enforced at every checkpoint.
B. REMEDIES FOR THE UNWARY PARENT
Pittman also deals a harsh blow to the efforts of parents in
enforcing and preventing interference with their custodial
rights. The remedies for parents whose children have been ab-
ducted by a non-custodial parent are limited.' ° One of these
remedies includes the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction. 8' The Hague Convention is a
civil remedy, and is designed to "secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to, or retained in, a foreign state,"
and "to ensure that the rights of custody and access under the
law of one ... state are effectively respected in the other foreign
states."182 The Hague Convention is not an extradition treaty,
but serves to return children to their "habitual residence" (their
residence prior to abduction).8 3 There are several steps that
must be met before the provisions of the Hague Convention can
be invoked.' 84 There are also several exceptions to the Hague
Convention, that can thwart a claim even if all the steps have
been met. 85 The Hague Convention is not always a reliable
180 See generally, Barone, supra note 100.
181 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501; T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (1980); implemented by
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (West 1999)
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
182 See id. at art. 1.
183 See id. at art. 3.
184 First, both states must be signatories to the Hague Convention. See id. at
art. 35. States that are signatories to the Hague Convention are: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark,
Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxemburg, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. See id. at art. 37. Iceland is no-
ticeably missing from this list, so the Hague Convention would not have been a
possible remedy to Pittman or Grayson. The child abducted must be under the
age of sixteen. See id. at art. 4. The removal or retention must be "wrongful," i.e.
the parent invoking the Hague Convention must provide that he or she has legal
custody of the child, and that he or she would have exercised custody over the
child had the child not been abducted. See id. at art. 3, 5, and 8. The home state,
i.e., the state the custodial parent is seeking the child to be returned to, must be
the child's "habitual residence." See id. at art. 3.
185 If a child has been removed for over a year and the abducting parent can
prove that the child is settled into his or her surroundings, then the court has
discretion as to whether it will invoke the Hague Convention. See id. at art. 12.
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remedy because "there is no iron-clad guarantee that the child
will be returned" and the rates of return among those nations
that are signatories to the treaty vary greatly."" And this remedy
is limited to countries who are signatories to the treaty, so if the
child has been taken to a non-Hague country (such as Iceland),
this remedy cannot be invoked.
In a situation where a child is taken to a non-Hague country,
there is little that can be done. The parent can petition the
State Department to negotiate for the return of the child. This
can be done in conjunction with the International Parental Kid-
napping Act (IPKA), which was enacted by Congress in 1993."'7
IPKA is designed to cover situations where the Hague Conven-
tion is not applicable, 8" and makes parental child abduction a
federal criminal offense where the parent wrongfully retains the
child outside the borders of the United States.' Through
IPKA, if there is an extradition treaty with the country where the
abducting parent took the child, the U.S. can request that the
abducting parent be surrendered.'90 Since it is a federal crimi-
nal offense, the federal government takes a more active role in
seeking the abducting parent.' 9 ' To be effective, however, there
must be an existing agreement between the U.S. and the foreign
country.' 9 2 Parents can also attempt to file proceedings in the
foreign country to regain custody of the child.'9 3 However,
many foreign jurisdictions are sympathetic to their own citizens,
The second exception is based on public policy in which a child will not be re-
turned home if doing so "would not be permitted by the fundamental principles
of the foreign state relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedom." Id. at art. 20. The Hague Convention also allows an abducting parent
to prevent the return of the child if he or she can show that the removal was not
wrongful, or that returning the child would subject the child to a risk of physical
or psychological harm. See id. at art. 13. A child's return may also be prevented if
a child refuses to return home and the court, in using its discretion, finds that the
child is of a certain age and maturity level where their view should be taken into
consideration. See id.
186 Kreston, supra note 100, at *24.
187 See International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1993)
[hereinafter IPKA]. This remedy was also not available in Pittman, because as the
court noted, Erna's conduct would have had to occur sooner since the statute
had not been enacted at the time of the abduction. See Pittman, No. 93 CIV 3974
JSM, 1997 WL 370331 at *3.
18 See 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N., 103th Cong. 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 103-173 at 2424-1.
189 See IPKA, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1993).
1o See id.
'9' See Barone, supra note 100, at 99.
192 See IPKA, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1993).
193 See Kreston, supra note 100, at *24.
20001 439
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
which was demonstrated in Pittman when the courts in Iceland
awarded Erna custody of the children despite the United States
custody orders.
Another possible remedy is to employ a mercenary group,
such as CTU, to retrieve the child." 4 These operations are risky,
involve illegal acts, and can often place the children in danger
during the rescue attempt, as well as risk the lives of the mem-
bers of the recovery team. 195 While these operations are some-
times successful, often they are not, as was evidenced by CTU's
attempt to recapture Elizabeth and Anna from Erna.'96
These remedies all apply after the abduction of the child has
occurred. So what is a parent to do if they suspect the abduc-
tion may occur, and wish to prevent it like Grayson and Pittman?
As Pittman demonstrates, phone calls will more than likely not
be enough to put an airline on notice. According to one com-
mentator, "most airlines, even the national airlines of non-
Hague contracting states, if presented with an order and/or re-
quests from law enforcement, will cooperate, at least, in ascer-
taining the legal authority of a minor child to be transported
from the United States, particularly given current airline secur-
ity regulations." ''9 The key here, and a lesson that can also be
taken from Hyatt, is to involve law enforcement officials. Unless
the standard for notice is relaxed, it is unlikely that anything
short of the involvement of law enforcement will be sufficient to
bring injunctive relief.198
While relief exists for a custodial parent whose child has been
abducted, the relief is limited. As demonstrated, most of the
remedies are not effective until after the child has already been
abducted. These remedies can be costly, lengthy, time-consum-
ing, and ultimately ineffective. However, as Pittman demon-
strated, it is difficult to prevent the abduction unless a parent is
194 See discussion supra Part I, note 14. See also Barone, supra note 100, at 114-
116.
195 See Barone, supra note 100, at 114-116.
196 See discussion supra Part I, note 14. See also Barone, supra note 100, at 114-
116.
I97 See Apy, supra note 2, at 90-95.
198 According to Apy, airlines are subject to reasonably injunctive relief, based
upon a broad "minimum contact" standard for jurisdiction. See id. However, she
finds that in order to do so, legal authority and identification of the children and
parties involved needs to be presented to the airline in a "timely fashion." See id.
However, it is unlikely that in most cases a custodial parent is going to become
aware of or suspect the abducting parent's plan until the last minute, when it may
be difficult to jump through all of the necessary hoops.
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aware of, and knows how to jump through, all the hoops neces-
sary to put the airline on notice. The next section addresses
what changes in policy and procedures need to take place in
order to prevent further abductions.
VII. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT FUTURE
ABDUCTIONS-THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
FROM PITTMAN
The following is a list of suggestions of what needs to be done
in order to prevent further situations like the one in Pittman
from arising.
A. CHANGES IN POLICY AND PROCEDURES AT AIRLINES
Procedures need to be implemented by airlines, especially
those that have international flights, for dealing with situations
when they receive a call that a parent may be traveling with mi-
nor children out of the country in violation of a court order.
Then, if a situation occurs as in Pittman, where an unwary parent
such as Grayson contacts an airline with his or her suspicion, the
airline will have procedures in place to either (1) investigate the
claim further and put their branches on notice of a possible ab-
duction, or (2) inform the parent of what steps need to be
taken, such as contacting law enforcement or requiring docu-
mentation indicating legal custody, in order for the airline to
take any further action. Arlines should not be able to claim
ignorance in situations where parents contact the airlines but do
not jump through all of the necessary hoops.
B. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF BOARDING PROCEDURES
Airlines should be required to strictly adhere to boarding pro-
cedures, especially those designed to enforce security. The
need is even greater on international flights. This should in-
clude heightened scrutiny of passengers traveling with minor
children, particularly when documentation and identification
do not match. Any blatant or gross deviation from standard op-
erating procedures should establish negligence per se on the
part of the airline.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT INVOLVEMENT
As was discussed earlier, law enforcement officials should be
contacted as soon as a parent becomes suspicious that a non-
custodial parent has plans to take a child out of the country
2000]
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against court orders. As Hyatt demonstrated, the involvement of
law enforcement officials can be effective, even in the face of a
form such as an Unaccompanied Minor Child Care Services
Request.
D. EXPAND SAFETY AND SECURITY EFFORTS
The focus should be on more than those harms related to
hijackers and terrorists, and should be expanded to include
other harms, such as criminals using airlines to escape criminal
liability, or as in the case of international parental abductions,
preventing children from being taken illegally against explicit
court orders. Safety and security regulations should be ex-
panded to include measures to prevent these sorts of harms.
E. STIFFEN PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS FOR AIRLINES AND
AIRLINE EMPLOYEES
As one commentator suggested:
[T] he federal government should enact legislation which would
place heavy fines or penalties upon anyone who aides or abets an
abducting parent. Correspondingly, courts would have to strictly
enforce these penalties. It is proposed that two different levels of
culpability be assigned to parties who assist kidnappings: intent
and willful blindness. It is believed that harsh fines would effec-
tively deter common carriers and individuals alike from assisting
a parent in "kidnapping" his or her child. Particularly effective
would be an attack on the most egregious offenders-common carriers
who allow a parent to leave the United States with a child who
does not have a valid passport. These offenders should befined most
severely in order to encourage common carriers to adopt prevent-
ative measures.' 99
Fines should be imposed, and these fines can be used to assist
custodial parents' efforts to retrieve their children. Violations,
such as the ones that occurred in Pittman, should find both the
airline and the airline employee(s) strictly liable or establish a
standard of negligence per se.
These are just a few suggestions as to what steps need to be
taken in order to curb the growing number of international pa-
rental abductions. Until the time when there is legislation or
procedures in place, parents should rely on their own instincts
and the assistance of lawyers and law enforcement officials in
' Barone, supra note 100, at 119 (emphasis added).
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order to prevent their child from becoming a victim of interna-
tional parental abduction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In its findings and declarations to the Hague Convention,
Congress made the following determinations:
(1) The international abduction or wrongful retention of chil-
dren is harmful to their well-being.
(2) Person should not be permitted to obtain custody of chil-
dren by virtue of their wrongful removal or retention.
(3) International abductions and retentions of children are
increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an inter-
national agreement can effectively combat this problem. 2111
While Congress recognized the growing problem of interna-
tional abductions and the resulting harm to children, it stopped
short by finding that an international agreement would be
enough to curb this phenomenon. Efforts need to be taken to
prevent the abduction of children before an abduction takes
place, not after it has occurred and the damage has already
been done. The first step toward preventing child abductions at
the national level, but also at the international level where the
stakes are higher and the remedies scarcer, is cutting off the
potential abductors before they can leave-that is, by stopping
them at the airport.
200 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601 (West 1999).
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